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Thinking and Doing Consent and Advocacy in Disabled 
Children’s Childhood Studies Research 
Jill C Smith  
This chapter contributes to the growing body of work in disabled children’s childhood 
studies which requires specific ethical considerations in design, methodology, procedure 
and perhaps most significantly, in everyday practice. I use the chapter as an example of the 
thinking and doing (i.e. the methodology and analysis) of disabled children’s childhood 
studies research. The chapter explores ethical issues inherent in research, particularly in 
relation to advocacy and consent, which are necessary in developing, delivering and writing 
an ethical project. 
 
I use this chapter to explore, in storied form, the ethical encounters from one particular 
research project working with disabled children and their families (Smith, 2016b). What 
began as an ethnographic project spawned in to something inherently auto/ethnographical 
due, in part, to the significant ethical dimensions within which I felt entangled as a 
researcher. Being a researcher, doing research, with disabled children and their families was 
a blurring of traditional researcher/researched relationships as I was invited into family 
homes, family lives and children’s everyday worlds. There are ethical imperatives at the 
heart of any work that puts the everyday, embodied lives of disabled children at the front 
and centre. 
 
My research and this chapter sit within dis/humanism, part of dis/ability studies (Goodley 
and Runswick-Cole, 2014; Goodley et al., 2016). The slash (/) of both dis/ability and 
dis/humanism brings to attention ‘...the meaning making of either side of the disability-
ability binary and the messy stuff in the middle. Dis/ability is also a moment of 
contemplation: to think again what it means to be dis/abled and what it means to be 
human’ (Goodley, 2014, x). Where dis/ability in its slashed form enters, we are invited at 
once to the ability complex of dis/ability and to question its form and power. Dis/humanism, 
as dis/ability, also takes the prefix ‘dis’ from dis/ability and from the colloquial verb ‘to dis’ 
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as in to dis-respect (Goodley and Runswisk-Cole, 2014). Dis/humanism in this sense, is 
ambivalent to the modernist conception of the human, independent, rational and 
contained, as it so often is incongruent or exclusive of those who experience dis/ability 
(ibid). Dis/human (Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2014), and more recently DisHumanism 
(Goodley et al., 2016), act as somewhat of a heuristic of dis/ability, which invites complexity, 
invites relationships and invites humanity, to a commitment of dis/ability politics. This turn 
in Critical Disability Studies is '...ambivalent about the human because too often it 
represents only a minority and bypasses the empirical human world' (Goodley and 
Runswick-Cole, 2014, p. 10). Instead of, as Titchkosky suggests is the case, 'detaching' 
disability from what it means to be human, dis/ability and the dis/human allows us a way in 
to renegotiate humanism to consider '...how we value the human and what kinds of society 
are worth fighting for' (Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2014, p.4). In bringing in the ‘dis’ to 
humanism, Goodley and Runswick-Cole (2014) ask that whenever we speak of the human, a 
politics of dis/ability should not be far behind. In more recent writing developing this 
compelling challenging of ‘the human’ Goodley, Runswick-Cole and Liddiard introduce us to 
the DisHuman child; the demand ‘to think in ways that affirm the inherent humanness in 
[disabled children and young people’s] lives but also allow us to consider their disruptive 
potential...’ (Goodley et al., 2016, p.777). This is a call to a new ethics in our research with 
disabled children, a different starting point, one which in both theory and practice affirms 
the humanity of a claim to childhood whilst recognising and disrupting its ableist, exclusive 
boundaries.  
 
The children I worked with all had labels of autism; they were living within bodies that were 
discursively constituted as both ‘child’ and ‘autistic’. Traditional conceptualisations of 
disordered childhood, such as those labelled with autism, ruminate on a particular ghostly 
spectre of ableism; the child with an autism label deviates from an imagined normative 
developmental trajectory. Research centred around this developmental deviation does not 
see an ethical imperative to value the lived, embodied childhood associated with this 
disordered cognition. From a different starting point, one of dis/ability and more specifically 
dis/human, we are able to shift our ethical gaze away from the disembodied disordered 
mind of a child and towards a politics which disrupts, and contributes to, what it means to 
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be a valued child and a valued human (Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2014; Goodley et al, 
2016).  
 
So what does this shift in our ethical gaze mean and why does it require distinct thinking 
and doing? Ethics here is not merely procedural, an adherence to social research or 
university ethical codes, it is a commitment to ethical values (Homan, 1992). Ethical here 
means understanding and valuing the everyday lived experiences of children and their 
families as valuable in and of themselves; to challenge the dominant discourses of 
medicalisation, pathologisation and psychologisation that stalk disabled children’s 
childhoods. To value and speak to their childhoods and their humanity. To trouble 
discourses and practices that do otherwise. To be ethical is to interrogate the moral 
implications both implicit and explicit in the designing and doing of a project; the risks and 
potentialities of such issues. ‘Ethics’ do not exist in a vacuum and take place in the social 
(Bulmer, 2008), that is, the commitment to ethical research takes place with the participants 
not simply before, or around them.   
 
It is with this commitment to ethics that I now turn to some of the most pertinent 
considerations embedded within this project’s conception and undertaking; consent, 
advocacy and valuing embodiment. What follows are a number of stories and reflections 
upon them about some of the poignant ethical moments I encountered in the thinking, 
doing and writing of this project. I focus on a conversation about consent and advocacy with 
Kate, a mum of five children with autism diagnoses, pertinent reminders of risk from two of 
Kate’s children, Max and Joe, and a brief example of the embodiment of consent with 
another child, Zac, which took place on a community allotment.  
 
Consent and Advocacy 
Billington (2006, p.8) asks us, as professionals working with children to question, ‘how do 
we speak of children?’ I extend this to the work we do in research with disabled children; 
how do we speak of disabled children?  
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It became apparent very early in meeting each of the parents in this particular project that 
advocating on behalf of their children was a familiar and well-worn path. I was to be one of 
many ‘professionals’ that had come before, and would come again, in to their family lives in 
the complex relation to dis/ability and their child. I write about the complexity of the ethical 
process in a formal sense of gaining informed consent from both the parents and the 
children, and the enmeshment of advocacy woven throughout parents’ conversations with 
me throughout the process. Parents, in their talk of their lives, children, autism and 
dis/ability, narrated the stories of other lives too, their other children, their partners, 
teachers, professionals and more. In recognising how stories seep into one another, 
spreading from one life to another, let’s consider some of the ethical possibilities inherent in 
such leakage; ‘the familial relation is not a simple one; it is an embodied relation and as such 
it is a messy, tangled nexus of love, hope, grief, anger, disappointment, joy and, always, 
always more’ (McGuire, 2010, p.1).  
 
I had originally developed an extended period of consent to be undertaken with the children 
in my project. This was to include a period of discussion with the parents including the 
sharing of ideas and materials (photographs, favourite TV characters, music, hobbies) to be 
developed into an interactive, personalised consent form on an iPad. This was designed to 
explain the purpose of being introduced to the children in a way that recognised the need to 
make such a process personal and meaningful for the child. However, for a number of 
reasons, some of which I will go on to explore, this digital process of personalised consent 
didn’t happen with any of the families. Instead parents gave written consent and the 
consent with children was established verbally and on a moment-by-moment basis.  
 
I turn here to the ethnographic story I wrote after a conversation with one mum about how 
I should be introduced to her son and what I would or should mean to him and him to me.   
 
We had an interesting conversation about how Kate should ‘pitch’ me to Max. She 
remarked that however she pitches me will effect whatever experience I am able to 
share with him and that I needed to know what that was manufacturing. Am I Kate's 
friend who is interested in stuff to do with autism? Am I a researcher? Am I from the 
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university? Or am I someone that likes to play with Lego? I very much wanted Kate to 
take the lead on this and talked about how I was never quite sure of how comfortable 
how much families had to ‘give’ to be part of research.  
We talked about consent and the assumptions and potential for ‘overdoing’ it. I 
explained my plans for the super-personalised digital consent and had to concede 
that, knowing Max as she does, Kate was probably right in suggesting I could just talk 
to him instead, negotiate a deal. She laughed as she said she didn’t have a problem 
consenting for him, she does it all the time anyway. Perhaps it's because we as 
parents think we have ownership over our children - Kate reflected. Her one 
reservation was about how much time I spent with Max and how he might become 
attached and then distressed after I stopped the research. We need to talk about this 
more. 
This story had the hallmarks of conversations I have had with the parents about consent for 
their child’s participation in numerous projects. Each in one way or another, as Kate 
reflected, seemed happy to claim ‘ownership’ over their child that if they said something 
was fine, the child would accept it was fine (or have to accept it). This varied from ‘oh 
there’s no point trying to explain it to them, they won’t get it anyway’ or ‘she’ll let you know 
if she doesn’t want you around, trust me!’ These responses to the consent process aren’t 
unique to this project or perhaps even specifically about parents referring to their child’s 
communication or comprehension skills in particular, but more a common discourse around 
parent-child decision-making. Within the sociology of childhood there has been an active 
move to counter the discourse that reifies children as passive in an adult-led world, 
submitting (or being without) agency in their decision making because of their lack of adult 
competency. Developing research projects with children’s active participation in the ethical 
consent process has been front and centre of such a move (James and Prout, 1997; Danby, 
2002; Christensen and O’Brien, 2003; Christensen and James, 2008). This paradigm shift 
brought with it research aimed at increasing the participation of children in their childhood 
(Clark, 2005). Traditional representations of the child as ‘...unreliable and developmentally 
incomplete’ (Mayall, 2008, p.110) were replaced.  This progressive research agenda strove 
for the recognition of the diversity and non-universal experience of childhood and was 
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undoubtedly hugely successful in redressing the positivist imbalance. I would suggest, as 
have others (Watson, 2012; Davis, 2012; Curran and Runswick-Cole, 2014), that the 
participatory research agenda has somewhat sidestepped or bypassed disabled children in 
an overly homogeneous conceptualisation of childhood agency and participation that 
doesn’t account for differing embodiments or communicative modes. As participatory 
methods with children developed, it became apparent that disabled children (in their 
diversity), who may enact their agency and autonomy in ways that were not normatively 
visible, remained at the margins of such research (Watson 2012). The beginnings of 
participatory methods were often framed around ableist conceptualisations of 
‘participation’; the autonomous child’s ‘voice’ being predetermined by a literal voice or 
observable social competencies (Davis et al., 2008). Disabled children, particularly those 
who didn’t use spoken language as their primary mode of communication remained 
marginal to, or excluded from, research which aimed recognise and value the diversity of 
childhood experience. Those critical of such exclusion of disabled children challenged 
researchers to recognise that enacting ‘voice’ in non-normative ways did not equate to not 
having anything to say (Beresford et al., 2004; Rabiee et al., 2005). In turning to a more 
critical conceptualisation of participation, the centring of ableist, normative markers of 
autonomy, agency and voice can be destabilised (Curran and Runswick-Cole 2014; Watson 
2012; Davis et al., 2008).  
In drawing together an ethic of disabled children’s childhood studies which recognises 
ableist approaches to conceptualising participation, I spent time considering how best to 
recognise agency and value communicative intent for the potential children I envisaged 
taking part in my project. I felt at times that I was becoming over-reliant on narrow cognitive 
conceptualisations of competencies associated with autism and communication that were 
pushing me towards a deficit-approach reifying children’s passivity in the process, for 
example, how to ‘compensate’ for children who didn’t use language. In drawing back from 
such a slippery slope I returned to the sociology of childhood’s framing of agency whilst 
resisting its normative stance. In de-prioritising spoken language, I turned my attention to a 
more visual and personalised presentation of what my project could mean to the children 
participating. This drew loosely on communicative strategies supported by autism theory 
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such as the Picture Exchange Communication System (PECS), which recognises the value of 
personalised, visual information. Where I would caution against the homogenisation that is 
latent within such assumptions about autism and communicative preferences, the adoption 
of techniques that at least offered creative inroads to the complex process of consent were 
welcomed.  
It was within such move that I had gone to such lengths to develop a creative consent 
procedure for the children that drew on notions that recognises their ability to 
communicate intent and make decisions. I stand by such an intent but also recognise its 
limits; I needed to be mindful not to undermine parents’ expertise about their children, 
whilst ensuring that my consent process centred around children as active in the process. In 
a similar quandary, Davis et al (2008) wrote of their ethnographic study with disabled 
children at school in which the children were homogeneously positioned as incapable of 
understanding the consent process, with the power to ‘access’ remaining firmly in the staffs’ 
hands. It seems possible that, perhaps not knowingly on either side, I was becoming re-
socialised by the parents and their constructions of their children by changing my original 
plans for consent. How was I to value the parents’ expertise about their children (a central 
call of the project) whilst simultaneously remaining mindful of what/who is conceived when 
parents advocate for their disabled child (McGuire, 2010)? 
I reminded here of the ever-pertinent words of Titchkosky (2007, p.3) who heeds us to ‘read 
our readings and watch our watchings’ of how we come to speak of disability in particular 
ways. Building on this, McGuire (2010) cautions that we need to be mindful of the ‘we’ 
being conceived when ‘we’ (parents and allies) seek to speak of ‘living with’ the disability of 
another (in this case the child). Taking Butler’s (2004) notion of ‘unknowingness’ the 
distance between you and I is at once what binds and separates us (McGuire, 2010, p.5); it is 
not a natural space but a negotiated one that happens at once between parent and child, 
researcher and family. McGuire contests the ‘we’ of those ‘living with’ disability and reminds 
us to be ever-mindful of the seamless leaps that are often presented as natural when 
describing our interpretation of another’s life. The temptation to gloss over the power 
exerted when a parent speaks of their child or for their child is not a site for moralising 
parents’ knowing of their child but a site to interrogate how the ‘other’ is always already 
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being reconstituted through such a storying even within intimate family relations. ‘To ‘live 
with’ the other, to speak the ‘we’, is always to be at risk of relation to the other violently 
(ibid). However, this risky space may also be an opportunity to re-enter the story that ‘we’ 
are telling and to tell it differently’ (ibid, p.14). 
 
The ethics of such a power imbalance and its complex facets, were at the heart of this 
project and remained a cautionary tale in my research with families, my writing of the 
stories and the analysis of the ‘we’ (the child, parents, and I) that I speak of. As I saw it, for 
this project to be ethically grounded, it had to be done with a commitment to not prioritise 
the parents over the children; to continually problematise the ‘we’ that was being conceived 
by myself, in interactions with parents, and children. Without problematising this ‘we’, the 
project risked further perpetuating the dominance of research that is carried out around 
disabled children’s lives that is actually exclusive of their experience and focuses only on the 
experience of their parents.    
  
There was tension within this; was the project becoming more about the parents at the 
expense of the experience of the children? I felt quite strongly that the process I had 
developed was conceived recognising the children’s participation actively in the consent 
process. So, despite moments of reservation, I had to take trust in each of the parent’s 
advocacy of their child’s consent in the first instance, and work on a range of verbal and 
embodied sharing of my project’s intentions and the children’s consent as I met them. This 
is not by any means to suggest that once the formal consent had been handed over by the 
parents that I assumed the children’s participation.  
Consent as embodied and ongoing 
As I have explained, I began by relying on relatively traditional tenets of ethical codes in a 
procedural sense, with a consent ‘form’ that perhaps was still overly reliant on markers of 
participation that favoured normative participation, spoken words, active agency 
demonstrated through a literal ‘voice’. In practice, the process of consent was very much 
embodied and enacted in a shared moment-by-moment becoming of participation. It was 
undoubtedly ‘assent’ that I sought rather than informed consent. This was not because I 
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believed the children’s consent to be unimportant or that I believed them to lack the agency 
or competency to give consent, rather that I problematise the ableism of the individualising 
concepts themselves.  It would be problematic to suggest the children participated in 
something that could be called informed consent by traditional definition; (1) presentation 
of information, (2) understanding, followed by (3) a response where consent is either given 
or withheld (Morris, 1998). Significantly, this was not exclusive to the children but speaks to 
more general issues around informed consent in research. I spent many hours conversing 
with parents about my project, its everyday workings, its potential outcomes and 
dissemination, and would still contend that many did not give fully informed consent 
relating to either their understanding or my presentation of information. On one occasion 
long after the formal consent process and several visits with the family, one of the dads said, 
‘Are you still wanting to do your study? When are you going to start?’ Somewhat taken 
aback, I realised that despite information sheets, consent forms and conversations 
explaining what the project would ‘look’ like, there was still an expectation somewhere that 
I would be doing some kind of formal studying of the children. There I was, digging away in 
their community allotment, chatting to a parent about school, the children pottering around 
me, doing my research, or so I had thought. The dad however, was seemingly still waiting 
for me to do something with his children. That my research didn’t involve testing, requiring 
the children to do something for me undid much of the negotiation of informed consent. 
This is an important lesson for those of us interested in research with disabled children 
about their childhoods, the expectations that we will be studying their impairments is a 
powerful one with a long history of pathologisation and medicalisation. The distinctiveness 
of disabled children’s childhoods studies lies within the challenge to this expectation; a 
valuing of research about everyday lives not impairments (Curran, 2014). Part of the role of 
disabled children’s childhood studies is in changing these starting points and redressing 
expectations. Part of the challenge is the reminder that this needs to involve on-going 
conversations with those we research about what ‘research’ is and what it looks like.   
So, instead of somewhat unreflexively assuming informed consent, I sought to understand 
children’s assent to my presence. This valued embodiment as a way of knowing and a 
process of meaning-making (Hackett, 2014; 2015). With the children at the allotments this 
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was often just a ‘checking in’ as I arrived at the site, a wave from a distance, a crouch to say 
hello or a shared plot of soil to dig alongside without the need for any direct interaction. I 
was never the only ‘stranger’ at the community site and the children seemed as indifferent 
to my presence as to any other adult who pottered and dug around their play for the most 
part. The children had the space to be far removed and out of site from mine, or anyone 
else's ‘gaze’ as much as they pleased and I made a conscious effort not to spend any time 
with them that wasn’t initiated by them. This meant that for the most part my time at the 
allotments was spent chatting to the parents and other adults and various siblings scattered 
across the site. Over time, as I became more familiar, Zac in particular began to initiate 
interaction with me, for the first time in the hunt for dock leaves after a he got particular 
distressing nettle sting.  
I’m pottering away weeding the seamlessly endless knots of weeds around the 
raspberries, chatting away to one of the mums about schools and classrooms and 
difficulties with friends in playgrounds. Zac is brought to my attention with a sharp 
scream before I catch sight of him in my periphery. He yelps, whoops and sobs, 
dragging me by the arm through the site to an area where he’d previously found the 
helpful leaf. I turn back to his mum to check she doesn’t want to intervene. She looks 
a little shocked and mouths quietly, ‘let’s see what happens, he always comes 
running to me, it’s good that he’s not’. I scramble for a leaf, with a vague panic that 
my choice wouldn’t be a medicinal leaf but something poisonous and assist in the 
ritual rubbing of the nettle sting until his sobs subside. Subdued, red in the face and a 
little snotty, Zac leans in to me for a moment and then carries on his merry way.  
  
On a different occasion, Max brought home the slippery task of truly informed consent and 
the difficulty in clearly articulating exactly what involvement in the project actually meant 
(Smith, 2016a). 
When I asked Max to write a story with me, about whatever he wanted, something 
that told me about himself, he was at first reluctant, then nervous, and eventually 
refused. Once he felt comfortable enough to share his objections it was clear that his 
unwillingness to participate was a caution that I should heed. His understanding of a 
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story was something made-up. If the story was going to be about him then it wasn’t 
made-up, because he was real, and ergo, whatever we did together wasn’t a story. 
Perhaps, he suggested, what I was actually asking him to do was write an article, like 
in a newspaper. That told people real things about him. To Max, if he were to share 
with me his ‘truth’ then why dress it up as a ‘story’? 
Max’s caution is a reminder of the need for clarity and an extended, negotiated process of 
consent. After all, mine and Max’s versions of what constituted a story were of course 
different for a number of reasons not least that I consider myself a storytelling researcher. I 
love writing and Max hates writing. It would be easiest to equate these crossed wires to a 
child/adult binary and to suggest that an adult would have understood what I had intended 
by the use of a singular word, ‘story’. That somehow discredits Max’s knowledge and 
overstates my explicitness. It has been helpful food for thought when considering the 
legitimacy of any process of consent as every being truly achieved within the procedure 
rather than a shared negotiated relationship between myself and the children and families. 
Joe, Max’s older brother challenged the legitimacy of ethics procedures, which are designed 
to protect and safeguard participants in research further in the following story.  
 
Joe’s reminder of risk  
Coming towards the end of a visit to the Goodwin’s, I come down to the kitchen after 
a stint of serious den-building and am greeted by a chuckling Kate and Joe who eyes 
me with caution and humour. ‘Joe has something he wants to ask you, Jill’ Kate 
smiles flitting her attention between me and Joe’s grin. Joe returned his gaze to his 
computer screen seemingly presenting as nonchalant. ‘He wanted to know if you 
were a paedophile. He asked me how I knew you weren’t a paedophile and I realised 
couldn’t say for sure, that I suppose I just assumed you weren’t. I asked him why you 
thought you might be - why else would an adult want to play with children, he thinks 
it's weird. I told him you weren’t a peadophile and that I trusted you. If I didn’t then I 
wouldn’t let you spend all this time with my kids would I? But then he asked if I’d be 
ok with you going up to my children’s bedrooms and playing if you were a man and I 
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realised that I wouldn’t be - so my son’s just pointed out that I’m sexist too!’ All the 
while Joe gives half of his attention to the conversation and to mine and Kate’s 
lighthearted dismissal of his lighthearted accusation. We all spend some time 
chatting through his astute recognition of such questionable consensual ethical 
agreements between myself and parents. Kate conceded that my university branding 
had given me de facto access to her children and de facto status as trustworthy and 
non-threatening. She had led her children to believe they were safe with me. She 
admitted that her willingness to take part in my project and to continually consent to 
my time spent with the children being somewhat reliant on my being a woman and a 
small, seemingly bubbly, young one at that. That if I’d been a man she’d have been 
suspicious - which she recognised as equally shaky but true nevertheless. Joe had 
recently been in trouble for having a ‘voice chat’ with someone he didn’t know over 
the internet. He’d be chastised for talking to strangers which was explicitly against 
the clear and defined rules of his access to computers. He’d be trading something 
complicated (the understanding of which fails me) and the voice transaction had 
made it easier and quicker. Debates around safety, predatory adults, strangers, and 
paedophiles was a hot-topic between Joe and his mum at the moment and he’d 
spotted inconsistencies in his mum’s line of argument by her agreement to let a 
relative stranger spend time alone with her children, something he considered far 
more risky than a virtual conversation.  
As lightheartedly as Joe and his mum negotiated a serious, and within the family context, 
legitimate concern, it was a pertinent reminder of the powerful discursive foundations 
which are brandished, often unwittingly, through mine and the parents in this project’s 
clandestine advocacy on the behalf of their children. It is a reminder that the will of the 
children in this project is always somewhat subjugated by that of their parent’s willingness 
to invite me in to their homes, schools willingness to open their classroom doors without 
question or hesitation. I am pleased that I am not asked if I’m a paedophile on a regular 
basis, that it is assumed that my intentions are legitimate rather than sinister but I am also 
troubled by it. Without any sinister intent, it perhaps shouldn’t be so readily assumed that 
my status as a university researcher makes me devoid of fault or the potential to harm 
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(despite ethics procedures designed to formalise such a commitment). There is inherent risk 
in research with people and children that at some point or another, my presence or actions 
can cause distress. Or that in the writing of a project, a paper or a chapter, ethical integrity 
also becomes problematic. In storying the life of others there is the potential for violence as 
McGuire (2010) cautions.  
Advocating Otherwise 
Here I draw on the overlap between the advocacy of parents consenting on behalf of their 
children, talking of their children within the storying of their lives, and the advocacy I rely on 
in my storytelling as a researcher. Many of the critiques of auto/ethnography as an ethical 
form of enquiry could equally be applied to the processes that happen when parents speak 
about their children, or for their children. Parents tread a line of ‘auto’ whenever they speak 
of their children as the storying of their lives as parents and the storying of their children’s 
everyday lives are wholly intertwined. As Tolich (2010) speaking of auto/ethnography, 
reminds us, even when we think we are speaking of ‘ourself’, we are implicating others, ‘the 
self is porous, leaking to the others (p.1608), which he fears is often without due ethical 
consideration of such blurring. Such leaking, Chang (2008) would argue is the fundamental 
to our lives as social beings, others are always visible and invisible in our storying of it, we do 
not live in a vacuum which Clandinin and Connelly (2000) then ask, if we tell a story, do we 
own it? I ask these questions of the stories I write in this chapter  and the conversations I 
have with parents about their children. My negotiation of the ethical rub of storying others’ 
lives is to consider Denzin’s suggestion that ‘telling does not subtract from other tellings; 
telling is not a zero-sum game’ (Denzin, 1996, p.47). This is a reminder of the ever-multiple 
becoming of storying as always incomplete and contingent on teller, listener, time, place, 
and a whole host of other factors (Davies et al., 2004). What must be remembered here is 
that these stories, though pinned to the page of a book chapter, forever remain unfinished. 
These are stories shared in a moment, on a particular day, with a particular researcher. 
These stories have been told before in different ways and will become re-told and re-
fashioned in other contexts, on other days, informed and moulded by other experiences and 
the passage of time. In that sense, they forever remain complex, incoherent, changing, and 
moving. I draw here on Pulsford’s (2014) claim to story-as-rhizomatic; they will forever 
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reach in multiple directions, morphing as they come in to contact with other stories, 
creating, disrupting and blurring assemblages. 
 
Stories left untold 
It is worth a brief aside here to acknowledge another specific ethical mire of this project in 
relation to the sharing of stories; the conversations I had with parents that I felt could not 
(or should not) be written. The reasons for such hesitancy in writing up certain 
conversations in to the storying of this chapter range from the blurring of the ethical 
integrity of telling others stories (for example of children and families not part of the 
project) or a much debated issue of storying aspects of lives that the participants hadn’t 
explicitly consented to being part of the project. Ellis (2007), a much revered 
auto/ethnographer, discusses the criticism that she has exploited consent as the people 
within her work had never given actual consent to be part of research. As much as I 
recognise that within an ethnographic process there are unexpected moments that could 
never be planned and prepared for, the only solace I could find within literature justifying 
either side of this coin was in Medford’s (2006) call to only ever include material that you 
would be happy for participants to read. I don’t expect that my participants will read my 
writing, in general,  but have used such a tool as my yardstick for when to take fingers to 
keyboards and when to leave encounters unwritten. There were conversations that I had 
with parents that were no doubt influential to the storying of theirs and their children's 
everyday experiences that nevertheless felt too intimate for the page. Stories of days spent 
with families in which I felt unable to write without drawing in aspects of their lives that I 
had never intended to be part of the project and they hadn’t ever thought would be 
included. Such is everyday life and a project based around it. These stories, though never 
written, have nonetheless inevitably permeated my writing of the project as they 
permeated my ongoing relationships with the families; they coloured my knowing and 
understanding of them and framed what it was possible to know and understand beyond it. 
It may seem somewhat of a teaser to speak of untold stories but it is an acknowledgement 
of the limitations of any project in its written form, and any writing to always be bounded 
and to recognise that any story told is never the only story possible.  
15 
Conclusions 
I am cautious and mindful to attend to the implicit discourses embedded in reductive or 
representational leaps of storying the experiences I shared with children and their families 
in this project. I cling tightly to a Critical Disability Studies imperative to expose and trouble 
ableism stalking the stories I told and the analyses I went on to make. McGuire’s (2010) 
cautionary tales of the risk and violence of advocacy bled in to the experience of storying, 
and relating to the experience of narrating these children and families everyday lives. I used 
these tools along with critiques of auto/ethnography as yardsticks to evaluate the more 
slippery ethical dimensions of what should and shouldn’t be written and how it should (or 
could) be analysed. The danger is always to slip into analytic practices that served no more 
of a productive purpose than the dominant discursive conceptualisations of children 
labelled with autism I seek to trouble. The potential and possibility of advocating otherwise 
(McGuire, 2010), is to stay with the conception and deployment of ethical procedures 
always as situated, problematised and taking place with participants. The distinctness of 
disabled children’s childhood studies ethics is to trouble conceptualisations and methods of 
participation, as I have shown in the development of consent processes, that challenge 
normative markers of agency that would exclude disabled children as less valuable 
contributors or unable to contribute (Curran and Runswick-Cole, 2014). This is a dis/human 
turn to claim (active participation) and reject narrow definitions (normative modes of 
participation) of what it means to be a valuable and valued child in everyday life (Goodley 
and Runswick-Cole, 2014).  
References 
Beresford, B., Tozer, R., Rabiee, P., & Sloper, P. (2004) Developing an Approach to Involving Children 
with ASD in a Social Care Research Project. British Journal of Learning Disabilities, 32(4), 180-185. 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-3156.2004.00318.x 
 
Billington, T. (2006) ‘Autism: Speculation, knowledge or understanding?’ Discourse: studies in the 
cultural politics of education, 27 (2), pp. 275-285. DOI: 10.1080/01596300600676292 
 
Bulmer, M. (2008) The Ethics of Social Research, in Gilbert, N. (Ed.) Researching Social Life, (Third 
Edition), London, Sage, pp. 145- 161. 
16 
 
Butler, J. (2004). Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence. London: Verso. 
 
Chang, H. (2008). Autoethnography as method (Vol. 1). Left Coast Press, Inc. 
 
Christensen, P. H. (2004). Children's participation in ethnographic research: Issues of power and 
representation. Children & Society, 18(2), 165-176. doi: 10.1002/chi.823 
 
Christensen, P., & James, A. (2008) “Introduction: Researching Children and Childhood Cultures of 
Communication” in P. Christensen and A. James (Eds.) Research with Children: Perspectives and 
Practices. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge. pp. 1-10. 
 
Christensen, P., & O'Brien, M. (Eds.). (2003). Children in the city: Home neighbourhood and 
community. London: Routledge. 
 
Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (2000). Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in qualitative 
research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Clark, A. (2005). Listening to and involving young children: A review of research and practice. Early 
child development and care, 175(6), 489-505. 
 
Curran, T., & Runswick-Cole, K. (2013). Disabled Children's Childhood Studies Critical Approaches in a 
Global Context. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Curran, T., & Runswick-Cole, K. (2014). Disabled children’s childhood studies: A distinct approach? 
Disability & Society, 29(10), 1617-1630. doi: 10.1080/09687599.2014.966187 
 
Danby, S. J. (2002). The communicative competence of young children. Australian journal of early 
childhood, 27(3), 25-30. 
 
Davies, B., Browne, J., Gannon, S., Honan, E., Laws, C., Mueller-Rockstroh, B., & Petersen, E. B. 
(2004). The ambivalent practices of reflexivity.Qualitative inquiry, 10(3), 360-389. doi: 
10.1177/1077800403257638 
 
Davis, J. (2012) ‘Conceptual issues in childhood and disability: integrating theories from childhood 
and disability studies’ in N. Watson, A. Roulstone, & C. Thomas (Eds.) Routledge Handbook of 
Disability Studies. London: Routledge. pp. 414-425. 
 
Davis, J., Watson, N., & Cunningham-Burley, S. (2008). Learning the Lives of Disabled Children: 
developing a reflexive approach. Research with children: Perspectives and practices, 201-224. 
17 
Denzin, N. K. (1996). Interpretive ethnography: Ethnographic practices for the 21st century. 
Sage. 
 
Ellis, C. S. (2007). Telling secrets, revealing lives relational ethics in research with intimate others. 
Qualitative inquiry, 13(1), 3-29. doi: 10.1177/1077800406294947 
 
Goodley, D., Runswick-Cole, K. (2014). Becoming dishuman: thinking about the human through 
dis/ability. Discourse: Studies In the Cultural Politics of Education, 1–15. 
doi.org/10.1080/01596306.2014.930021 
 
Goodley, D., Runswick-Cole, K., & Liddiard, K. (2016) The DisHuman child, Discourse: Studies in the 
Cultural Politics of Education, 37:5, 770-784, DOI: 10.1080/01596306.2015.1075731 
 
Hackett, A. (2014). Zigging and zooming all over the place: Young children’s meaning making and 
movement in the museum. Journal of Early Childhood Literacy, 14(1), 5-27. 
doi:10.1177/1468798412453730 
 
Hackett, A. (2015). Young children as wayfarers: learning about place by moving through it. Children 
& Society. DOI: 10.1111/chso.12130 
 
Homan, R. (1992). The ethics of open methods. British Journal of Sociology, 321-332. 
 
James, A., & Prout, A. (1997). Constructing and reconstructing childhood: Contemporary issues in the 
sociological study of childhood. London: Falmer Press. 
 
Mayall, B. (2008) “Conversations with Children: Working with Generational Issues” in P. Christensen 
and A. James (Eds.) Research with Children: Perspectives and Practices. 2nd Edition. London: 
Routledge. 109-124. 
 
McGuire, A. (2010). Disability, Non-disability and the Politics of Mourning: Re-conceiving the ‘we’. 
Disability Studies Quarterly, 30(3/4). Retrived from http://dsq-sds.org/ 
 
Medford, K. (2006). Caught With a Fake ID Ethical Questions About Slippage in Autoethnography. 
Qualitative Inquiry, 12(5), 853-864. DOI: 10.1177/1077800406288618 
 
Morris, J. (2003). Including all children: finding out about the experiences of children with 
communication and/or cognitive impairments. Children & Society, 17(5), 337-348. DOI: 
10.1002/CHI.754 
 
Pulsford, M. (2014) ‘Rupturing narratives: material-discursive entanglements and the becoming-
other of male primary teachers’ paper presented at Troubling Narratives: Identity Matters at 
Huddersfield University, June 19th and 20th 2014. 
18 
 
Rabiee, P., Sloper, P., & Beresford, B. (2005). Doing research with children and young people who do 
not use speech for communication. Children & Society, 19(5), 385-396. doi: 10.1002/chi.841 
 
Smith, J. C. (2016a). The embodied becoming of autism and childhood: a storytelling methodology. 
Disability & Society, 31(2), 180-191. 
 
Smith, J. C. (2016b) The Talking, Being, and Becoming of Autism, Childhood, and Dis/ability. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, The University of Sheffield. 
 
Titchkosky, T. (2003). Disability, self, and society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
 
Tolich, M. (2010). A critique of current practice: Ten foundational guidelines for autoethnographers. 
Qualitative Health Research 20(12):1599-610. doi: 10.1177/1049732310376076 
 
Watson, N. (2012). Theorising the Lives of Disabled Children: How Can Disability Theory Help? 
Children & Society, 26(3), 192-202. doi: 10.1111/j.1099-0860.2012.00432.x 
 
